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Introduction 
Recent empirical work on the causes of terrorism has suggested that in contrast to 
studies on political coups and civil wars, economic factors are not significant predictors 
of terrorism.  If these results hold up to further testing, the implications for governmental 
policy are potentially tremendous.  This paper will build on work by Alberto Abadie 
(2004) to test the robustness of his conclusions and to see if economic factors have a 
causal relationship with the risk of terrorism. 
Currently there are two general schools of thought on the root causes of terrorism.  
The side usually endorsed by the current U.S. administration believes primarily that 
spreading freedom and democracy will eat away at the political frustration and lack of 
rights that cause marginalized groups to lash out with terrorism.  To quote from President 
Bush’s 2005 State of the Union Address, “The only force powerful enough to stop the 
rise of tyranny and terror, and replace hatred with hope, is the force of human freedom.”  
The European Union tends to take the other perspective that terrorism must be fought at 
its root causes, and that these causes include poverty and inequality, though they also 
acknowledge the importance of political rights.  It is important to realize that these are 
not two dramatically opposed views, but rather a spectrum in which some countries 
weigh economic opportunity as more important than political freedom, and vice versa.   
If the recent suggestions that political rights alone determine the level of terrorism 
prove correct, then it could add additional justification to calls for the toppling of 
oppressive governments and the use of force to spur transition to democracy.  However, 
if economic opportunity is also shown to have a relation to terrorism, then more peaceful 
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methods of preventing terrorism may be available. It is evident from this ongoing debate 
that the questions this paper asks are extremely important. 
 
Review of Literature 
 Until very recently, almost all empirical work done on the causes of terrorism had 
a focus on transnational terrorism.  The few exceptions tend to be anomalous case studies, 
usually of Israel and Palestine, one of the few hotbeds of terrorism where the data are 
available and good.  Studies such as in Krueger and Laitin (2003) find that GDP per 
capita and GDP growth rate are not significant predictors of transnational terrorism, but 
that politically free countries are likely to be targeted by agents from politically 
oppressed countries, regardless of wealth.  Other studies like Krueger and Malečková 
(2003) go further against conventional wisdom that assumes poverty is a source of 
terrorism, concluding that among Palestinians wealthier and more educated individuals 
are actually more likely to be terrorists than poorer individuals.  
International terrorism is extremely important to study, but according to the MIPT 
Terrorism Knowledge Base, funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
international terrorism has only accounted for 10-15% of the total global number of 
terrorist acts in each of the last three completed years (2002-2004).  This means that these 
studies are only looking at one narrow kind of terrorism.  While it may be the case that 
international acts have drawn the most attention since the September 11 attacks, it is 
worth noting that the second most deadly attack on U.S. soil, the Oklahoma City 
bombing, was a purely domestic act of terrorism.   
3
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Very recent work by Abadie (2004) is able to make significant improvements on 
previous work because he uses an inclusive and robust measure of terrorism as his 
dependent variable.  Rather than using U.S. Department of State data which only count 
instances of transnational terrorism, Abadie (2004) chose country-level index data 
assessing the combined risk of both domestic terrorism within a country and transnational 
terrorism on that country’s territory at home and interests abroad.  This index allows 
consideration of a much wider and more realistic range of terrorist activities, in addition 
to expanding the number of countries that can be considered. Nonetheless, the Abadie 
(2004) paper points to conclusions similar to the earlier transnational studies, finding that 
GDP per capita has little to do with terrorism and that political freedom is the most 
important determinant of such acts.  
 Despite many strengths, Abadie (2004) still leaves room for further improvement.  
In measuring economic factors, only GDP per capita was considered, though the UN 
Human Development Index and the Gini Index were tested for robustness.  Other 
hypothesized predictors of terrorism that have been tested in previous literature, such as 
GDP growth and unemployment level, were not investigated.    
The determinants of international terrorism have been investigated very 
thoroughly, but it remains to be seen to what extent those results apply when domestic 
terrorism is also considered.  This paper builds on Abadie (2004) by introducing an 
updated dataset and including a variable for total adult unemployment rate.  Replicating 
much of the Abadie (2004) methodology, this paper finds that unemployment is a 
significant predictor of terrorism in addition to political freedom, population 
fractionalization, and geography. 
4
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Data 
Table I includes brief definitions and descriptive statistics of the dataset described 
below.  Following Abadie (2004), as my measure of the risk of terrorism I use the 
notoriously difficult to obtain World Market Research Centre’s Global Terrorism Index 
2003/4 (GTI).  The GTI includes domestic and transnational acts that fall under a broad 
definition of terrorism as, “The unlawful and premeditated use of violence intended to 
coerce or intimidate a government or civilian population as a means of advancing a 
political or ideological cause.”  The GTI also rules out any acts by sovereign states as not 
constituting terrorism.  The GTI rates 186 countries on a possible scale of 1-100; higher 
numbers indicate greater risk of terrorism to a country and its assets abroad in the 12 
months following the index’s publication.  The risk score is composed of five factors 
which forecast terrorism, differently weighted depending on significance: motivation 
(40%), presence (20%), scale (20%), efficacy (10%), and prevention (10%). 
Improving on the sample size in Abadie (2004), I use data from World Bank as 
provided to the United Nations (UN) on 2002 GDP per capita in purchasing power parity 
(PPP) as a measure of poverty.  Though this data is from 2002, as opposed to the 2003 
data that Abadie uses, I believe it represents an improvement.  The greater completeness 
of the data allows for observations on over a dozen countries that were dropped in earlier 
studies.  Furthermore, per capita PPP is a more accurate measure of poverty than just 
looking at the raw GDP.  The weakness of using slightly older data is that while in most 
countries changes were likely very small, some salient examples like Iraq or Afghanistan 
5
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have likely changed more dramatically.  However, examples such as those are rife with 
endogeneity problems and that makes it hard to say if they would actually be better. 
To ensure that the results are robust and maintain ease of comparison to Abadie 
(2004) this paper will use the most recent UN Human Development Index (HDI) or the 
Gini Index in place of GDP in some regressions.  The HDI weighs life expectancy, adult 
literacy, combined enrollment ratios for all levels of schooling, and GDP to give each 
country a value from 0-1 with higher numbers representing the most development.  The 
Gini Index is a measure of inequality in a country; it is defined as the area between the 
Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage.  A 
value of 0 represents perfect equality and 100 represents perfect inequality.  
To measure the degree of political freedom in each country I use Freedom 
House’s Freedom in the World 2004 Political Rights Index.  This rates countries from 1-7 
with a lower score representing greater freedom. Perhaps because I used 2004 data, as 
opposed to 2003, I managed to improve on the sample size over Abadie (2004) with data 
on territories and disputed areas in addition to the independent countries that he considers.  
As such, this paper is not forced to drop Hong Kong, Macau, Puerto Rico, the Palestinian 
Authority, or North Korea.  The Freedom House also reports a Civil Liberties Index 
which was used by Krueger and Laitin (2003); however this index is highly collinear with 
the Political Rights Index used by Abadie (2004) and would provide almost exactly the 
same result.  Regardless, in order to keep comparability between this paper and Abadie 
(2004) at a maximum, I opted to stick with the political rights measure. 
 Just as Abadie (2004) did, I take linguistic, ethnic, and religious fractionalization 
indices from Alesina et al (2002).  The indices represent the probability that any two 
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individuals chosen at random from a country belong to different linguistic, ethnic, or 
religious groups.  There are two important things to keep in mind with these data.  Firstly, 
ethnic and linguistic fractionalizations are significantly correlated.  It is not surprising 
that individuals of different ethnic groups are more likely to speak different languages 
than people of the same ethnic group.  Secondly, when they measure linguistic 
fractionalization, which proves to be the most important of the three indices in this 
paper’s regressions, Alesina et al (2002) look at data on first languages only.  They do not 
look at whether individuals are likely to share a common language.  Somewhere like 
Montreal, where residents move comfortably between French or English, will have a 
fairly highly linguistic fractionalization index even if there is no real difficulty in 
communication.  Thus it may be the case that the linguistic fractionalization variable is 
proxying for some combination of linguistic, ethnic, and other cultural factors.   
Regardless of its precise makeup, there is little reason to think that it may be correlated 
with any of the other variables tested in this paper and it maintains its usefulness as a 
measure of social division within a country.    
 Geographic data come from Gallup, Mellinger, and Sachs (2001) and measure 
country land area, average elevation, and the fraction of land area in the Köppen-Geiger 
tropics.   
 Finally, I include data from the International Labor Office (ILO) on the total adult 
unemployment rate in a country.  The data are the annualized values for the most recent 
year available, which is 2003 in the vast majority of cases.  Unfortunately, data were only 
available for 117 of the 186 countries in this study.  The countries that are left out are 
consistently very poor, have higher linguistic fractionalization, have fewer political rights 
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and are often involved in violent conflicts.  However, the distribution of terrorist risk in 
the group without data is roughly similar to the distribution of risk in the sample with 
unemployment data reported.  The list of countries without adequate unemployment data 
however includes Iraq, Afghanistan, and most of Africa.   
 
Empirics and Results 
To begin my empirical work, I use the country-level cross-section data described 
above in a series of Ordinary Least Squares regressions.  The general form of the 
estimating equations is: 
ln(terrorist risk) = β0 + β1 ln(GDP per capita) + β2 X + ε 
The vector X includes all of the potential predictors of terrorism previously described: 
lack of political rights, unemployment, geographic variables, and linguistic, ethnic, and 
religious fractionalization.  All regressions also include an exhaustive set of regional 
dummy variables based on the groupings used in the WMRC-GTI. 
 For my initial series of regressions, I considered the maximum number of 
observations available as I went along.  Thus, as more variables are added in, the number 
of observations in the regressions has the unfortunate trend of decreasing.  The results of 
these regressions are reported in Table II.  Columns (1) – (5) mirror estimations in 
Abadie (2004), and produce very similar results even with my slightly modified data set.  
The coefficient on log GDP in column (1) is significant and shows that a 1% increase in 
GDP per capita is associated with a .19% reduction in terrorist risk.   
Columns (2) and (3) add in the index for lack of political rights and show the non-
monotonic relationship of political rights and terrorist risk as found in Abadie (2004).  
8
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This relationship shows that countries on both ends of the political rights spectrum are the 
least likely to suffer terrorist attacks.  Liberal countries with many political freedoms and 
authoritarian countries where people are highly regulated have the least risk; but middle-
ranking countries, often in a state of political transition, have the greatest risk. 
 The three fractionalization indices are added in column (4) and we find that only 
linguistic fractionalization bears a significant coefficient.  Also in this column, the 
coefficient on GDP remains negative, but becomes statistically insignificant.   In column 
(5) the ethnic and religious fractionalization indices are removed, causing two major 
changes in the estimation.  Firstly, the coefficient on linguistic fractionalization becomes 
significant at the 1% level, where it had previously only been at the 5% level.  This is not 
surprising because of the degree of colinearity with ethnic fractionalization may 
previously have divided some of the relationship between the two variables.  Secondly, 
we see that the coefficient on log GDP per capita has returned to significance, marking 
the first serious departure from the results in Abadie (2004) yielded by the different data 
set in this paper.  Regardless, further tests still manage to reduce the coefficient on log 
GDP per capita to insignificant levels. 
 In column (6) I introduce my novel variable of total adult unemployment rate into 
the estimation equation.  The previously included variables all remain significant to at 
least a 10% level and unemployment is found to be highly significant at a 1% level.  The 
regression estimates that a 1% increase in the adult unemployment rate is associated with 
a .02% increase in the risk of terrorism in a country.   
 Due to concerns about possible endogeneity, because terrorism can certainly 
weaken an economy, in columns (7) through (12) this paper tries to go a step beyond the 
9
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level of GDP per capita.  In those columns I include geographic variables for country size, 
average elevation, and tropical climate with the rationale that studies have related 
geography and climate to wealth, and that certain types of geography may lend 
themselves more to terrorism than others.  For example, the mountains of Afghanistan 
have proven notoriously difficult to flush terrorists out of and have definitely contributed 
to Afghanistan’s 6th place ranking out of the 186 countries in the GTI.   
 In column (7), with the unemployment variable left out, the geographic variables 
essentially overwhelm the rest of the included factors.  The regression coefficients on all 
three geographic variables are significant at a 1% level.  Linguistic fractionalization 
remains significant, but now only at a 10% level and political rights and GDP fall out of 
the range where they can be statistically distinguished from zero.   
 However, when we add back in unemployment as a regressor in column (8), the 
degree of political freedom becomes once again significant, but now linguistic 
fractionalization is no longer significant.  It is difficult to speculate about the reason for 
the phasing in and out of significance of political freedom and linguistic fractionalization.  
The two variables are not collinear to any mentionable degree with each other or with 
unemployment, so why they interact as they do is not obvious.  
 Instead of GDP per capita, in columns (9) and (10) poverty is measured with the 
UN Human Development Index.  The HDI is a broader measure and includes health and 
education components in addition to GDP.  Column (10) yields results very similar to 
column (8), with unemployment and geographic variables once again highly significant.  
This suggests a degree of robustness to the results obtained with GDP per capita. 
10
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 However, in columns (11) and (12) where poverty is now measured with the Gini 
Index, the coefficient on the index is significant as are the coefficients on all other 
estimation variables.  The coefficient on the Gini Index is negative which surprisingly 
suggests that wealth inequality may be associated with a reduction in terrorist risk even 
though overall average wealth in a country is not.  If there were causality here, it would 
mean that countries with a high degree of equality are actually more at risk of terror than 
very unequal countries.  This result is contrary to other evidence which concludes that 
characteristics that make people feel marginalized make them more likely to resort to 
terrorism.  This may just be the result of a small sample size and the skewing effect of a 
large number of extremely unequal African countries that do not draw the ire of any 
terrorist groups, though the included regional dummies should insolate the results from 
such effects.  However, there is a chance that there is a genuine relationship between 
equality and terrorism, as counterintuitive as it seems.  
 It is interesting to note that in column (11) the results of this paper differ from 
those of Abadie (2004) despite running almost exactly the same regression as he does at 
one point.  The Abadie (2004) paper does not find Gini coefficients to be significant. To 
look deeper at this problem, the only difference between my data and that in Abadie 
(2004) is that my data on linguistic fractionalization is 1 year more recent and contains 1 
fewer observation.  Whichever country was dropped, it may be an outlier in its Gini 
coefficient or in some other way.  This should give us further caution before drawing any 
conclusions about economic inequality and terrorist risk.   
 Overall, the results on the OLS regressions found in Table II show that when 
country characteristics for linguistic fractionalization, political freedom, unemployment, 
11
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and geography are considered, neither GDP per capita or human development have 
significant relationships with terrorist risk. 
 
OLS Robustness 
 Unemployment rate was shown to have a highly statistically significant 
association with the risk of terrorism in the above OLS regressions.  However, there are 
several potential complications to be addressed before any hard conclusions can be drawn.   
 One immediately apparent problem is the number of observations in regressions 
containing an unemployment variable is noticeably lower than the baseline regressions 
building up to it.  This is because unemployment data is unavailable for a large number of 
less developed countries or countries in the midst of domestic strife.  Regardless of the 
reasons for the reduced number of observations, the problem is that changes in the dataset 
may cause significant changes across the board, causing one column not to be 
comparable to its neighbor. 
 In order to address this problem, I created a second, limited dataset containing 
only the 105 countries for which I had a complete set of data on all tested variables.  
Descriptive statistics for the limited dataset are reported in Table III.  If we compare the 
statistics from the full data set in Table I with this limited set, we can get a rough idea if 
the omitted countries share common characteristics.   
 A quick comparison shows that the two data sets exhibit very little difference in 
mean and standard deviation for dependent variable, terrorist risk, as well as many of the 
right-hand side variables.   The two most prominent differences are in GDP per capita 
12
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and in political freedom.  The omitted countries tend to be a little poorer and a little less 
politically free.   
When looking at the regressions on the 105 country sample, we should keep a few 
things in mind.  First, because GDP per capita ended up not being significant once other 
characteristics were accounted for in the earlier regressions, we should be skeptical if that 
result changes.  Second, the mean of the freedom index has dropped, indicating more 
freedom in the 105 country sample, while the terrorist risk statistics have remained 
basically constant.  If the non-monotonic result for political freedom proves to be robust, 
then we should expect to see the positive coefficient on political rights and the negative 
coefficient on political rights squared become farther apart, indicating more dramatic 
sloping to the non-linear curve as we move along the spectrum from liberal states to 
authoritarian states.   
Table IV reports the estimation coefficients after running the same series of 
regressions as earlier on the limited 105 country sample.  When compared to the earlier 
results in Table II, the limited sample produces extremely similar estimations.  All of the 
previous conclusions about the complete dataset hold for the smaller set with the possible 
exception that linguistic fractionalization is not as consistently significant in the 105 
country set.  From this, I conclude that the 105 country set has no glaring irregularities 
that distinguish it from the larger set.  Overall, this gives strong support for concluding 
that the highly significant estimation coefficients on unemployment are robust.   
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Cautions 
Prior to drawing final conclusions, let me caution the reader with some of the 
general weaknesses of this study.  First and most important is that terrorism is impossible 
to truly predict.  Terrorists operate on a global scale and work actively to strike where 
they are unexpected.  Some like Al-Qaeda have very wide goals and targets around the 
world; some act solely in their own countries as rebel groups too small to fully start a 
civil war.  This paper hopes only to shed light on some of the factors that correlate with 
terrorist risk, be it by drawing the attention of international terrorists, as in the case of the 
United States, or by producing local terrorism as in Columbia.     
Another point of caution is that while I have shown that at least one economic 
variable is significant in addition to social and political factors, the predictive power of 
unemployment is not as strong as those of the other significant factors.  Though highly 
statistically significant, even if we granted complete causality to unemployment (which 
would be extremely charitable) the magnitude of the coefficient is small relative to the 
other significant variables and does not explain the majority of the dependent variable.  
That said, when the unemployment variable is added beyond all other considered factors 
in Table II, the R2 value goes from 0.35 in column (7) to 0.47 in column (8); this is not a 
small jump by any means.   
Further, when testing unemployment rates endogeneity problems may exist.  
Terrorism has a negative impact on economies and can disturb business, reduce growth, 
and very possibly as a consequence raise unemployment.  This is an extremely difficult 
problem for which to control.  Perhaps a better measure than recent annualized 
unemployment rate would have been to look at long-term unemployment or rates over a 
14
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few recent years.  Unfortunately, data on unemployment is already scarce for a huge 
number of countries and I am unable to find long-term unemployment data for more than 
a handful of countries beyond the OECD.  While questions of endogeneity are difficult to 
resolve empirically, the significant correlation is nonetheless present and there are many 
good reasons to think that unemployment may indeed have a causal relationship to 
terrorism.  
 
Conclusions 
Using a more complete dataset than previous studies and testing new variables, I 
find that the economic variable of unemployment has a significant association with 
terrorist risk.  My results also confirm previous work suggesting that political freedom, 
population fractionalization and geography are also powerful predictors of terrorism.  
Like other studies, I find that GDP per capita does not have a statistically significant 
relationship with terrorism once these other variables are taken into account.   
My results also suggest that as a country’s Gini coefficient increases, meaning the 
gap between rich and poor grows, terrorist risk may be reduced.  However, these results 
are counter-intuitive and never significant beyond the 10% level.  Therefore, I hope to do 
more testing in the future with inequality and Gini coefficients before drawing any hard 
conclusions about inequality and terrorism.     
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Table I 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Terrorist Risk WMRC Global Terrorism Index 2003/04 186 40.05 19.87 10 94
GDP per capita GDP per capita in PPP for 2002 in US dollars 169 9312 10122 520 61190
Human Development UN Human Development Index 2002 171 0.70 0.18 0.27 0.96
Gini Index Index of income or consumption inequality, various years 122 40.6 10.17 24.4 70.7
Lack of Political Rights Freedom House Political Rights Index, 2004 182 3.52 2.16 1 7
Linguistic Fractionalization Probability two random individuals have different native language 173 0.39 0.28 0.002 0.92
Ethnic Fractionalization Probability two random individuals have different ethnicity 174 0.45 0.25 0 0.93
Religious Fractionalization Probability two random individuals have different religion 181 0.43 0.23 0.002 0.86
Unemployment ILO annualized adult unemployment rate of both genders, 2003 117 9.60 6.53 1.1 36.7
Country Area Area in million square kilometers 161 0.81 2.03 0.0026 16.6
Elevation Average elevation above sea level in hundred meters 161 6.17 5.57 0.092 31.86
Tropical Weather Fraction of country in Köppen-Geiger tropics 161 0.31 0.41 0 1
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Table II – Terrorism and Country Characteristics 
OLS with Robust Standard Errors 
Dependent variable: Natural logarithim of WMRC Global Terrorism Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
-0.1990*** -0.1618*** -0.1286** -0.0909 -0.1058** -0.1276* -0.0775 -0.0403
(0.0452) (0.0467) (0.0495) (0.0550) (0.0518) (0.0762) (0.0532) (0.0770)
-0.2134 -0.0473
(0.4160) (0.6175)
Gini index -0.0087* -0.0112*
(0.0049) (0.0058)
0.0508** 0.2507** 0.2226** 0.2225** 0.3419** 0.1840 0.2828** 0.2271** 0.3075*** 0.2104* 0.2708**
(0.0252) (0.1028) (0.1082) (0.1054) (0.1303) (0.1121) (0.1193) (0.1106) (0.1166) (0.1065) (0.1222)
-0.0249** -0.0218* -0.0220* -0.0389** -0.0197 -0.0354** -0.0243* -0.0379** -0.0237* -0.0339**
(0.0119) (0.0124) (0.0122) (0.0168) (0.0129) (0.0151) (0.0126) (0.0148) (0.0130) (0.0168)
0.5397** 0.4962*** 0.4315** 0.3533* 0.2387 0.3655** 0.2292 0.4811** 0.3603*
(0.2271) (0.1634) (0.1887) (0.1793) (0.1885) (0.1797) (0.1884) (0.1861) (0.1937)
-0.0045
(0.2477)
-0.0711
(0.1692)
0.0212*** 0.0221*** 0.0220*** 0.0213***
(0.0072) (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0070)
Country Area 0.0516*** 0.0506*** 0.0492*** 0.0490*** 0.0458*** 0.0503***
(0.0124) (0.0137) (0.0122) (0.0133) (0.0145) (0.0169)
0.0182*** 0.0270*** 0.0201*** 0.0287*** 0.0204*** 0.0283***
(0.0061) (0.0075) (0.0060) (0.0072) (0.0061) (0.0072)
0.3699*** 0.4858** 0.3759*** 0.5077*** 0.4306*** 0.5439***
(0.1228) (0.1863) (0.1238) (0.1844) (0.1302) (0.1776)
R-squared 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.26 0.27 0.35 0.35 0.47 0.35 0.47 0.44 0.53
Observations 169 169 169 158 160 110 147 105 147 105 117 92
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Average Elevation
Tropical Weather 
Percentage
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  All regression included a comprehensive set of regional dummy variables based on the country groupings used in 
the  WMRC-GTI.
Linguistic 
Fractionalization
Ethnic 
Fractionalization
Religious 
Fractionalization
Unemployment 
Rate
Log GDP per 
capita (PPP)
Human 
Development Index
Lack of Political 
Rights
Lack of Political 
Rights Squared
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Table III 
Descriptive Statistics – Limited Dataset 
 
 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Terrorist Risk WMRC Global Terrorism Index 2003/04 105 43.47 20.66 12.5 94
GDP per capita GDP per capita in PPP for 2002 in US dollars 105 11717 10992 580 61190
Human Development UN Human Development Index 2002 105 0.77 0.1345 0.34 0.96
Gini Index Index of income or consumption inequality, various years 92 39.0 10.16 24.4 70.7
Lack of Political Rights Freedom House Political Rights Index, 2004 105 2.83 1.97 1 7
Linguistic Fractionalization Probability two random individuals have different native language 105 0.31 0.25 0.002 0.92
Ethnic Fractionalization Probability two random individuals have different ethnicity 104 0.38 0.23 0.002 0.93
Religious Fractionalization Probability two random individuals have different religion 105 0.40 0.23 0.002 0.86
Unemployment ILO annualized adult unemployment rate of both genders, 2003 105 9.22 6.36 1.1 36.7
Country Area Area in million square kilometers 105 1.01 2.46 0.0027 16.6
Elevation Average elevation above sea level in hundred meters 105 6.12 5.61 0.092 31.86
Tropical Weather Fraction of country in Köppen-Geiger tropics 105 0.24 0.38 0 1
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Table IV – Terrorism and Country Characteristics with Limited Sample 
OLS with Robust Standard Errors 
Dependent variable: Natural logarithim of WMRC Global Terrorism Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)† (9) (10)† (11) (12)†
-0.2053*** -0.1730** -0.0994 -0.1095 -0.1029 -0.1122 -0.0343 -0.0403
(0.0660) (0.0831) (0.0919) (0.1023) (0.0901) (0.0861) (0.0834) (0.0770)
-0.0792 -0.0473
(0.6665) (0.6175)
-0.0099* -0.0112*
(0.0059) (0.0058)
0.0295 0.3377** 0.3674** 0.3315** 0.3284** 0.2931** 0.2828** 0.3107** 0.3075*** 0.2786** 0.2708**
(0.0477) (0.1392) (0.1470) (0.1409) (0.1379) (0.1227) (0.1193) (0.1235) (0.1166) (0.1310) (0.1222)
-0.0407** -0.0443** -0.0398** -0.0368** -0.0396** -0.0354** -0.0414*** -0.0379** -0.0376** -0.0339**
(0.0176) (0.0183) (0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0153) (0.0148) (0.0177) (0.0168)
0.5351** 0.3964* 0.3716* 0.2686 0.2387 0.2609 0.2292 0.4152* 0.3603*
(0.2601) (0.2025) (0.1909) (0.2014) (0.1885) (0.2023) (0.1884) (0.2091) (0.1937)
-0.2680
(0.2941)
0.1726
(0.2621)
0.0220*** 0.0221*** 0.0220*** 0.0213***
(0.0073) (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0070)
0.0516*** 0.0506*** 0.0504*** 0.0490*** 0.0500*** 0.0503***
(0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0131) (0.0133) (0.0163) (0.0169)
0.0279*** 0.0270*** 0.0292*** 0.0287*** 0.0269*** 0.0283***
(0.0078) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0072) (0.0076) (0.0072)
0.4229** 0.4858** 0.4393** 0.5077*** 0.4671** 0.5439***
(0.1991) (0.1863) (0.1957) (0.1844) (0.1942) (0.1776)
R-squared 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.36 0.42 0.47 0.42 0.47 0.48 0.53
Observations 105 105 105 104 105 105 105 105 105 105 92 92
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% † Identical to regressions in Table II
Average Elevation
Tropical Weather 
Percentage
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  All regression included a comprehensive set of regional dummy variables based on the country groupings used in 
the  WMRC-GTI.
Linguistic 
Fractionalization
Ethnic 
Fractionalization
Religious 
Fractionalization
Unemployment 
Rate
Country Area
Log GDP per 
capita (PPP)
Human 
Development Index
Lack of Political 
Rights
Lack of Political 
Rights Squared
Gini index
 
21
Goldstein: Unemployment, Inequality and Terrorism: Another Look at the Relat
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2005
